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MIAMI,  FLORIDA When  I  first accepted  your  kind  invitation to  come  to  Miami  to 
speak  on  the  United  States  and  the  European  Community:  the Challenges 
Ahead,  I  thought  that  this  would  be  in  the  nature of  an  exercise  in 
forecasting. 
As  it is,  there are certainly challenges  ahead  but  I  suspect that 
they are going  to  be  a  continuation of  challenges  that  are  already with 
us,  particularly in  the  fields  of  economics  and  trade.  Were  they not 
met  and  properly dealt with,  they could,  in time,  threaten not  only the 
economic  partnership that exists between  the  United  States  and  the 
European  Community,  but  also  the  economic  and  political unity that we 
are building  up  in  Europe. 
Boiled  down  to  their essentials,  the  two  major  problems  we  face 
are these:  first,  how  to  reconcile  the  new  economic  policy being 
pursued  in  the  Unit~d States with  the effects it is having  in Europe  -
and  second,  against  the background  of  the Community's  $25  billion trade 
deficit with  the  United  States,  how  to  manage  our  trade relations  in  a 
way  that  ensures  we  avoid  a  future confrontation. 
These  are  the  two  challenges  that  I  would  like to  go  into with  you 
today,  I  do  so  because  they  are  immediately before  us  and  have  to  be 
dealt with as  a  matter  of  some  urgency. 
At  the  same  time,  we  should  not  allow  them  to  obscure  our vision 
of other  problems  that still lie ahead. 
Let  me  spend  just a  moment  to mention  them  in  case  they  are 
forgotten  in  the  hurly-burly of  the present. 
There  is  the whole  question  of  what  is  known  as  burden-sharing;  of 
who  does  what  and  who  spends  how  much  on  ensuring  our  collective 
security.  This  encompasses  not  simply military preparedness  and 
defense but  also  the  whole  question of  foreign aid. 
In  the  European  Community  we  in general  see  economic  aid  as  a 
means  toward  promoting  orderly economic  development  in less  developed 
countries  and  thereby contributing  toward  political stability in the 
developing world.  We  also  see it as  being  in  our  own  economic 
self-interest  to  help  develop  the  economies  of  these countries, 
important  as  they are  to  the western world,  both as  sources  of  raw 
materials  and  as  a  market  for  our  own  products. 
The  United  States does  not  share  this view  to  the  same  extent. 
Indeed  present  policy  appears  to  favour  limiting what  are  already, 
relative  to  our  own  contributions, fairly low levels of  development 
aid. 
This  need  not necessarily be  a  cause  for  frictions  between us,  so 
long  as it is recognised  in  the whole  debate  over burden-sharing that, 2 
although  what  one  is doing  may  be different,  the  aims  and  the 
objectives  are going  in the  same  direction. 
It applies  too  on  political  issues  such  as  the Middle  East  and 
southern Africa. 
On  such  issues  Europe  speaks  more  and  more  with  one  voice.  This 
voice will not  always  be  a  perfect  echo  of  American  utterances  on  the 
same  subjects. 
That  is  why  genuine  consultation must  take place  and  must  be  seen 
to  occur.  And  by consultation  I  mean  each  asking  the other  for his 
point of view and  then  taking it into  consideration before  taking  a 
final  decision.  By  consultation  I  do  not  mean  information  of  a  final 
decision just prior  to  its implementation. 
But,  to  return  to  the  immediate  challenges  that  I  mentioned  at  the 
outset  of my  remark~, let me  deal first with  the  economic  problem.  One 
would  need  to  be  a  Rip van  Winkle  not  to  know  that the  United  States 
has  set sail on  a  new  economic  course. 
The  objectives of  the u.s.  policy  are  to bring  do~m inflation,  to 
increase  the  growth  rate,  thereby insuring  a  stable and  sustained 
development  of  the u.s.  economy. 
Given  the  pivotal position of  the  United  States  in  the  world 
economy,  we  in  Europe  cannot but  applaud  these objectives. 
We  have  everything  to  gain  from America's  restored  economic 
strength.  If inflation is brought  under  control  in the  United  States, 
it makes  it that much  easier for  us  to wrestle with  the  same  seemingly 
endless spiral.  If American  industry  invests  and  produces  efficiently, 
we  shall share  in  the  economic  growth  that follows. 
Four  principal means  are being  employed  to attain these 
objectives:  cuts  in public  expenditure,  limited growth  in money  supply, 
tax  reductions  and  deregulation  in general. 
The  objectives are laudable;  the  instruments effective;  the  time 
propitious. 
Indeed,  the u.s.  Government  is considerably assisted  in 
implementing its policy by  favourable  external  factors,  such  as  in 
particular  the  current  reduction  in oil prices. 
And  yet  why  do  we  hear questioning  and  criticism abroad?  It is 
for  none  of  the  reasons  I  have mentioned  but  reflects  certain fears, 
because domestically  and  immediately,  the  U.S.  Government  appears  to  be 
laying great  emphasis  on  the  control  of  the money  supply.  The 
consequence  of  this is  the very high  interest rates  that we  have  been 3 
experiencing  for  some  time  now  in  the  United  States. 
High  interest rates  in the  United  States  such  as  those  we  have 
experienced  over  the  last  18  months  mean  rising  interest  rates  in 
Europe  where  they  have  reached  levels which  can be  tolerated with 
increasing difficulty over  time because  they  limit  the  margin  of 
maneuver  of  the authorities  who  have  to  deal  with  an  ever-deepening 
economic  crisis. 
Right  or wrong,  our  concern  in  Europe  is that interest rates may 
remain  high  in  the U.S.  for  some  considerable length of  time  as  the  new 
economic  policy is implemented. 
The  effects of  this are very detrimental  in  Europe,  where  the  rate 
of  growth  of  the  economies  appears  to  have  been  far more  affected by 
high  interest rates over  the  last  two  years  than  in the u.s ••  Thus, 
investment  would  co~tinue to  stagnate,  we  will continue  to  experience 
zero  and  even negative rates of  growth  and  our  unemployment  rate will 
continue  rising possibly  to  reach  intolerable levels. 
Indeed  we  are seeing  this  happen already.  Because  of  existing high 
interest rates  in  the  United  States  we  have  the situation where,  in 
certain member  countries,  a  ten point gap  exists between  the  rate of 
inflation and  current rates  of  interest.  This  is reflected  in  a 
current  unemployment  rate of more  than  10%,  a  rising budget  deficit  and 
a  negative growth  rate. 
In  the  European  Community  as  a  whole,  the  unemployment  rate now 
stands at  8%  the highest  level  since  the  1930s.  On  present  trends 
it is likely to  reach  10%  in  the  coming  year. 
In  the United  States, it is generally  agreed  that with  a  4%-5% 
unemployment  rate,  you  in fact  have  full  employment. 
In  Europe,  where  in particular frictional  unemployment  is much 
lower  than here,  we  generally accept  full  employment  as  meaning  1%  or 
less  unemployed.  This  therefore  implies  that  the  level  of  unemployment 
is much  higher  than  in  the  U.S.  already  and  may  soon,  on  a  comparable 
basis, be  close  to  the  double  you  have  here. 
lfuat  is more,  an  alarmingly high proportion -- 43%  -- of  the 
Community's  jobless  are  young  people  under  the  age  of  25. 
These  are not  just cold  economic  facts.  They  rapidly translate 
into  social  and  political facts  of  a  somewhat  higher  temperature. 
The  consequences  of  young  people  entering  the  job  market  for  the 
first  time  and  finding  they  are  not  welcome  in it should be  given  some 
consideration. 4 
One  should not  be  surprised  that  these  same  young  people may  be 
less willing  than  is  normal  at  such  an  age  to  accept  traditional values 
and political beliefs.  One  should  equally not be  surprised  that 
societies that  cannot  provide  employment  for  an  increasing  percentage 
of  their  able  population may  be less willing  to  accept  added  financial 
burdens  to  ensure  their defense  and  security.  Indeed,  the high  cost of 
servicing  the  debt  in  a  number  of member  countries  has  reached  such 
levels  that  authorities  are  facing  unpalatable  choices  between  cuts  in 
social benefits which  for  the  above mentioned  reasons  are difficult  to 
envisage,  or  a  reduction  in  the defense  effort. 
Such  social  and  political  consequences  would  not,  in  any  way, 
serve  the  interests of  the Western Alliance  as  a  whole.  A  Europe  that 
is economically weakened  is  a  Europe  that is politically weakened.  It 
is  a  Europe  that  would  be  less  able  to  play  a  constructive role  in 
meeting  the major  challenges  of  this  decade:  challenges  that  the 
United  States would,' I  am  sure,  wish  that  we  meet  together  with  them. 
So  to  come  back  to  what  is at  the  root  of  the  problem:  high 
interest rates  and  the  fear  that  the u.s.  monetary  policy may  mean  that 
we  have  to  live with  them for  a  fairly long  time  to  come. 
The  question for  us  in Europe,  and  it may  become  one  for  the 
United  States,  is how  to  bring  interest rates  down  without  abandoning 
the  fight  against  inflation.  As  I  said earlier, we  continue  to  applaud 
the  objectives  of  the Administration's  economic  policy. 
It is  the  spillover effect  in  Europe  of  the means  that  are 
currently most  relied upon  to  achieve  these objectives  that is  the 
problem. 
In other words,  our  concerns  would  be alleviated if the policy mix 
were  such  that  interest rates  show real  signs  of  abatement  in  the near 
term. 
This,  I  understand,  implies  therefore on  the  one  hand  a  gradual 
and,  I  hope,  even  a  sharp  rise  in  the  propensity  to  save which  at  the 
moment  is very low -- a  third  or  less  than what  it is  in Europe  or 
Japan -- as  well  as  a  progressive reduction of government  calls  on  the 
money  markets,  which  implies  a  real  reduction  in  the budget  deficit. 
Even  if there were  signs  that  interest rates  were  falling,  it 
would  not,  however,  mean  that all our  concerns  over  monetary policy 
were  removed.  There  would  remain  the  problem  of  exchange  rates  and  the 
question of  whether  the  United  States  was  prepared  to  intervene,  when 
necessary,  in  the markets  to maintain  a  measure  of  international 
currency stability. 
We  all know  the  consequences  of volatile movements  in  exchange 
rates.  This  is  why,  traditional!y,  central banks  have  been  prepared  to 5 
step  in  from  time  to  time at moments  of difficulty or crisis  to  support 
one  another's  currencies,  to  deter  speculation  and  to  avoid violent 
fluctuations  in exchange  rates. 
Recent  statements  seem  to  indicate  that  the  United  States  is  now 
inclined  to  follow  a  policy of  non-intervention  in this field.  This 
would  constitute  a  departure  from  traditional practice.  This  may, 
however,  make  it more  difficult for  the  other countries  in the Western 
World  to  insure an  orderly functioning  of  exchange markets. 
In the  Community,  in particular,  the member  countries  have,  for 
just over  two  years  now,  been operating  and  developing what  is  known  as 
the  European Monetary  System.  Through  such  a  system,  we  are  creating  a 
zone  of monetary stability in  Europe  with  obvious  benefits  to  business 
and  industry. 
It is also worth  noting  that  the  existence of  this  system  implies 
a  degree  of  cooperation between our  governments  that reinforces  the 
economic  unity that we  are gradually building  in  Europe. 
In  the  long  run,  such  a  system,  if strengthened  and  developed, 
carries with it two  corollaries:  in the first place, it would  encourage 
a  gradual harmonisation of  the  economic  policies of  the Member  States 
of  the  Community  and  simultaneously become  the  starting point  of  a 
European  currency  which  would  have  an  important  role  to  play  in 
contributing  to  a  more  stable world monetary  system.  But  this is not 
the moment  to  expand  on  perspectives  which  have  been  so  eloquently 
described  by  such  distinguished  economists  as  Professors  Triffin, 
~1undell and  others.  In  the meantime,  however,  that  is  today,  the main 
world  reserve  currency  remains  the u.s.  Dollar.  Any  economic  crisis  in 
one  or more  of  our Member  States  could  lead  to  disruptive  effects  on 
the  exchange markets.  One  would  then,  like in  the  past,  see  the  other 
central banks  in  the  Community  intervene  to  smooth  out  such  temporary 
disturbances. 
The  effectiveness  of  such  intervention is however  less great  in a 
situation where  the u.s.  authorities  ~muld take  a  "hands-off" attitude. 
To  the  extent  that  such  interventions  are less effective,  this 
would  mean  that grave  strains would  be  imposed  on  the European Monetary 
System;  these,  over  time,  could  lead  to  its survival being put  into 
question. 
None  of  what  I  have  said about  the  effects of u.s.  economic  policy 
in Europe  precludes  the necessity of  facing  up  to  and  dealing with  the 
challenge of  our  own  economic  problems.  The  point  I  wish  to  make, 
however,  is that  our  efforts  to  do  so  are not  assisted by  the 
additional burdens  that U.S.  economic  and  monetary policy is  currently, 
and  perhaps  unwittingly,  thrusting upon  us. -------------------------------------~ 
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The  repercussions  of  the  preceding  developments  are felt  in many 
areas,  particularly in the  trade  field.  High  interest rates  contribute 
in no  uncertain way  to  the  worsening  economic  situation in  Europe. 
It becomes  increasingly difficult on  our  side  to resist  demands 
and  pressures  for  protection  from  those  firms  and  workers  who  seek 
relief  from  import  competition,  or  see  their  access  to  traditional 
export markets  limited.  The  u.s.  and  the  European  Community  are each 
other's major  customer.  In  1980,  the u.s.  exported  to  the  E.C.  $62 
billion worth  of goods,  whereas  the  E.C.  exported  $37  billion worth  to 
the U.So,  leading  to  a  U.S.  surplus of  $25  billion. 
Partly because of  agricultural  trade,  where  again,  we  are  your 
major  customer,  the  United  States  has  enjoyed  a  large and  growing 
surplus  in its trade with  the  Community. 
From  our  point of view,  our  trade deficit with  the  United  States 
in  the  past has  been something  we  could  reasonably live with. 
However,  in  the past  year,  our deficit with  the  United  States  has 
more  than doubled  to  $25  billion;  more  than  twice  the deficit that  the 
United  States or  the  E.C.  has  with  Japan. 
It is inevitable that,  against  the background  of  a  sharply rising 
deficit of  this magnitude,  one  would  see  protectionism rearing its ugly 
head.  In spite of all these  factors  playing  against  us,  we  have 
remained  faithful  to  the  free-trade  philosophy  which  constitutes  a 
basic  corner  stone of  the  Common  Market. 
So  far,  we  have been  able  to  hold  the line  and  we  earnestly hope 
to  be  able  to  continue  doing  so. 
Trade  restrictions would  be  in no  one's  interest, least of all 
would  it be  in  the  interest of  the  United  States,  in view of  the 
surplus it enjoys  with us. 
It is  therefore  a  little surprising for  us  to  be hearing  the 
language  of  trade warfare being uttered  on  more  than  one  occasion 
recently by high-ranking  U.S.  officials. 
It is all the more  surprising as  we  are  not  aware  of  there being 
any major  complaint  about  any  trade measures  or practices by  the 
Community  other  than  on  the question of  export  credits. 
One  might  understand  a  complaint  that  a  $25  billion surplus  was 
having  an  inflationary effect  on  the u.s.  economy,  due  to  the  increased 
income  generated  and  the  reduced  availability of goods  on  the  domestic 
market. 
One  does  not hear  this  complaint,  least of all, of  course,  from 7 
the  one  million u.s.  workers  whose  jobs exist  simply because  of  this 
surplus. 
And  yet, not  to  put  too  fine  a  point  on it, we  are being  addressed 
in public  in  a  language  that  is not  only  tough but  uncompromising. 
There  are and  probably always  will be  points at  issue between  us 
in  our  trade relations.  The  history of  our  commercial  relationship 
shows  that  such points  can be  resolved  by patient diplomacy  and 
negotiation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  last decade  was  very successful 
in  achieving  great progress  toward  further  liberalisation of  world 
trade. 
This -cannot be  done  if either party decided  to  travel  the  road  of 
confrontation.  It is a  very narrow road  that  allows  little room  for 
flexibility or maneuver.  Once  you  are  on it, there is very grave 
danger  of  collision with  untold  damage  being  done  to  all who  are 
involved. 
I  do  not believe that we  have  taken  that road.  I  strongly hope 
that  the  tough  language  I  have  referred  to  does  not  indicate  that  there 
are  some  who  may  wish  to. 
They  should  be  aware  of  the full implications.  Between  us,  the 
United  States  and  the Community  account  for  roughly half  of  all world 
trade.  If  the  rhetoric we  hear  of  trade warfare is  translated  into 
action,  the  consequences  would  be difficult  to  assess. 
The  irony is that  this  type  of  economic  warfare could well be 
sparked off by  one  relatively insignificant and  avoidable  issue. 
Take  that  of export  credits for  example.  The  American  complaint 
is that  Europe  is reluctant  to  raise interest rates  on  export credits. 
This  has  prompted  some  fairly strong  language  by senior u.s.  officials. 
Yet,  it is  a  dispute which,  to  return  to  a  point  I  made  earlier on 
monetary policy,  would  disappear  overnight if u.s.  and  European 
interest rates generally were  to  return  to  sensible levels. 
I  have  tried  to  deal  in  these  remarks  with  what  I  see as  the 
principal challenges  facing  us  in  the  economic  and  commercial  fields. 
I  would  not  like it to be  thought  that  these  questions  can be 
considered  in  isolation  from  the political relationship between  the 
United  States  and  Europe. 
It would  be  a  great mistake  to believe that, if there were  turmoil 
in  our  economic  relations,  that  there  could  continue  to  be  sweetness 
and  light in any  other relationships.  It is with  the  good  of  our 
collective well-being  and  security  in mind  that  I  have  chosen  to  speak 
to  you with  some  frankness  on  these  issues  today. 